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Abstract
We examine the phenomenon of real-income stagnation in a large cross-section of countries during 
the last four decades. Stagnation is deﬁ  ned as negligible or negative growth extending over a number 
of years. We ﬁ  nd that stagnation has aﬀ  ected more than three ﬁ  fths of countries (103 out of 168). 
Stagnating countries were more likely to have been poor, in Latin America or sub-Saharan  Africa, 
conﬂ  ict ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports.  Stagnation is recurrent: countries 
that were stagnators in the 1960s had a  likelihood of 75 percent of having been stagnators in the 
1990s.
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Sanjay G. Reddy and Camelia Minoiu
Th   e literature on the determinants of average real income growth is vast. However, until recently little atten-
tion has been paid to characterizing or explaining the qualitative features of the income or growth sequence 
(going beyond averages). Th   ere is a burgeoning interest in understanding patterns (as opposed to average 
levels) of economic growth. Examples include Ben-David and Papell (1998) (who attempt to identify struc-
tural breaks in the income series between 1950 and 1990 in a cross section of countries) and Pritchett (2000) 
(which analyzes the instability and volatility of growth rates). Rodrik (1999) considers “growth collapses” 
and concludes that countries that are conﬂ  ict-ridden and have weak institutions of conﬂ  ict-management 
have experienced the sharpest income downturns. More recently, patterns of “growth acceleration” have been 
studied by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), who ﬁ  nd that growth acceleration episodes are not well 
predicted by standard growth determinants or by the occurrence of economic reforms.
Th   is paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, it describes patterns of 
growth in an innovative way. Speciﬁ  cally, the paper identiﬁ  es and describes episodes of sustained negligible 
or negative income growth, which we refer to as stagnation spells. We discuss the conceptual diﬀ  erence be-
tween real income stagnation spells and other concepts concerning the pattern of economic growth. Second-
ly, the paper aims to identify the factors disposing countries to stagnation.
We ﬁ nd that real income stagnation has aﬀ  ected a signiﬁ  cant number of countries (103 out of 168). 
Countries that suﬀ  ered spells of real income stagnation are found more likely to be poor, in Latin America or 
sub-Saharan Africa, conﬂ  ict ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports. Stagnation is also found 
very likely to persist over time.
Th   e study of growth patterns is driven by two main motivations, one explanatory and the other 
normative, both of which underpin our work. Th   e explanatory motive is to analyze patterns of real income 
growth in order better to understand the process of economic growth. Th   e normative motive is to determine 
whether and how distinct welfare assessments should be made of diﬀ  erent income streams (and associated 
growth patterns).
Th   e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Th   e next section deﬁ  nes stagnation, describes the 
conceptual diﬀ  erence between stagnation and low average growth, that between stagnation spells and other 
features of the growth sequence, and discusses the welfare implications of diﬀ  erent stagnation experiences. In 
the following section, we describe features of the stagnation experience in a large cross-section of countries 
between 1960 and 2001. Th   e fourth section investigates the factors associated with stagnation. Th  e  penul-
timate section provides evidence of the persistence of stagnation over time. Th  e  ﬁ  nal section contains our 
conclusions.
1  We would like to thank the United Nations Development Programme for supporting the earlier phase of this research 
project.2  DESA Working Paper No. 28
What Is Stagnation?
Identifying and explaining stagnation may in principle require a distinct approach than does identifying 
and explaining the causes of poor growth experience as such. Th   e reason is that stagnation spells are concen-
trated periods of negligible or negative growth. An uninterrupted sequence of poor growth years constitutes a 
stagnation spell. In this section of the paper, we begin by formalizing the concept of stagnation. Th  ereafter, 
we discuss the conceptual diﬀ  erence between stagnation and low average growth. Finally, we discuss whether 
the occurrence of stagnation spells should inﬂ  uence our judgments concerning the welfare experienced by 
diﬀ  erent countries.
Identifying Spells of Stagnation
We use time-series data on the GDP per capita of countries.2 Th   e study period is 1960-2001. Since data are 
not available for all countries and all years, the ‘end of the study period’ for a speciﬁ  c country refers to the 
most recent year for which data are available.
Th  e  onset of a stagnation spell is deﬁ  ned as a year in which a country’s per capita real income is lower 
than at any time in the previous two years and higher than at any time in the subsequent four years. At the 
onset of a stagnation spell, a country’s per capita real income is both the lowest in the three-year interval 
concluding with it, and the highest in the ﬁ  ve-year interval beginning with it. Th   is criterion is deliberately 
deﬁ  ned stringently, so as to avoid identifying brief interruptions of growth as stagnation spells. Although the 
onset of a stagnation spell is deﬁ  ned in terms of the relation between income levels in adjacent years, the mo-
tive is reliably to identify the onset of periods of sustained negligible or negative income growth.
A turning point is deﬁ  ned as a year in which a country’s real income is at least one per cent higher 
than it was in the previous year, and at least one per cent lower than it is in the subsequent year. Th  is  crite-
rion is made permissive, so as to capture the resumption of sustained income growth, even at a low level.
2  Income in a given year is represented by the three-year moving average centered on that year, in order to focus on 
meaningful variations that are not due to measurement error or very ﬂ  eeting economic shocks. We use data on the 
GDP per capita in constant local currency units. Our reason for using LCUs is that PPP-adjusted real GDP ﬁ  gures 
are not, properly speaking, inter-temporally comparable. Attempts to make them so, such as the Penn World Table 
(Version 6.1), introduce other distortions that we wish to avoid here. Th   e spells of stagnation that we identify are 
largely dependent on the features of the per-capita income time series, which are appropriately captured by LCU data. 
Inter-country comparability of time-series is not required for this purpose. Th   e main aim of the paper is to introduce 
the concept of real income stagnation and examine its empirical relevance. We operationalize the concept of real 
income stagnation using LCU GDP data; however the analysis can easily be conducted using PPP-adjusted GDP 
ﬁ  gures instead. Such an exercise would yield largely similar results due to the high correlation between year-on-year 
growth rates of the two GDP series. We have calculated these correlations for a sub-sample of 108 countries from our 
main dataset (for which PPP-adjusted GDP data for 1960-2000 are available in PTW Version 6.1). Almost two thirds 
of the countries had a simple correlation coeﬃ   cient larger than 0.80, and three quarters of the sampled countries had a 
correlation coeﬃ   cient larger than 0.70. For speciﬁ  c countries, the two times series diverge [For a detailed study of the 
divergence between PWT and LCU data in the case of Venezuela, see Rodriguez (2006)]. In our view the LCU time 
series is to be strongly preferred in such cases since it is dependent on local national income data and does not reﬂ  ect 
adjustments brought about for the sole purpose of level comparability across countries. Th   e PWT income series for a 
country often reﬂ  ects the use of arbitrary premises or adjustments for a variety of reasons including the past or present 
non-participation of many countries in the price surveys of the International Comparison Programme (requiring 
reliance upon questionable regression estimates for these countries), the arbitrary choice of overlapping ‘link countries’ 
to relate real incomes in one region to real incomes elsewhere, the impact of the choice of base year on comparisons 
of real-incomes across country-years, and other factors. We do use PWT incomes where they are needed to undertake 
cross-sectional comparisons of countries. Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  3
A spell of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the period from the onset of stagnation to the ﬁ  rst turning point 
after the onset. We deﬁ  ne the length of a spell as the length of this period. Since the criterion for identifying 
the onset of stagnation is stringent and the criterion for identifying the turning point is permissive, spells 
deﬁ  ned in this way are deﬁ  ned stringently.
Th  e  depth of a spell of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the diﬀ  erence between the income at the onset and the 
minimum income during the spell, expressed as a share of the income at the end of the study period. Th  e 
depth of the spell of stagnation has a counterfactual interpretation. Speciﬁ  cally, it represents the percent-
age by which the per capita income of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study period if 
it had experienced a constant income between the onset of stagnation and the year in which the minimum 
income during the spell was attained instead of having had the income path that it actually had. Th  is  coun-
terfactual is conservative in that it assumes zero growth rather than positive growth in this time interval. Th  e 
concepts of spell of stagnation, depth and length of stagnation, are illustrated in Figure 1 for Syria.
Th   e income at the end of the study period is deﬁ  ned as the average of the incomes in the last three 
years of the study period (1960-2001), so as to avoid idiosyncratic results that derive from the presence of 
short-term volatility.
Identifying Countries as Stagnators
A stagnator is deﬁ  ned as a country that has experienced a spell of stagnation at some point during the study 
period.
A country’s length of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the lengths of all of the spells of stagnation it 
has experienced.
A country’s depth of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the depths of all of the spells of stagnation it 
has experienced. A country’s depth of stagnation has a counterfactual interpretation. Speciﬁ  cally, it represents 
Figure 1:
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the percentage by which the per capita income of a country would be higher than it is at the end of the study 
period if it had experienced a constant income between the onset of every spell of stagnation and the year in 
which the minimum income during that spell was attained, instead of having had the income path that it 
actually had. Th   is counterfactual is conservative in that it assumes zero growth rather than positive growth 
over each such time interval.
During a given decade, a country is deﬁ  ned as a decadal stagnator if at least three years within the 
decade belong to a stagnation spell. Th  is  deﬁ  nition is designed to avoid counting as decadal stagnators 
countries that merely experienced the end (or beginning) of a spell of stagnation in a given decade. Rather, it 
identiﬁ  es a country as a decadal stagnator if it has experienced a suﬃ   ciently long period of stagnation in the 
decade.
A country’s decadal length of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the number of years spent in spells of stagnation 
during the decade.
A spell of stagnation is used to calculate the decadal depth of stagnation (deﬁ  ned below) if at least 
three years belonging to the spell are contained within the decade.
A country’s decadal depth of stagnation is deﬁ  ned as the percentage by which its income at the end of 
the decade3 would have been higher if it had experienced zero growth in each interval from the ﬁ  rst year of 
a stagnation spell within the decade to the point at which its minimum income during the spell and during 
the decade were experienced (rather than having had the growth experience that it actually did).
Stagnation versus Low Average Growth
Th   e conceptual diﬀ  erence between stagnation (as deﬁ  ned above) and low average income growth can be un-
derstood as follows: a stagnation spell consists of an uninterrupted sequence of poor growth years. In contrast, 
an episode of low income growth can be composed of any sequence of growth years, including a sequence 
which involves alternating positive and negative income shocks. Diﬀ  erent income paths can possess the same 
average growth rates but very diﬀ  erent patterns of growth, some of which contain stagnation spells and some 
of which do not. Suppose that t y represents the real income per capita of a country in time period t, and  t y  
represents the growth rate of real income per capita between (t-1) and t. Consider the following identity, 
which reﬂ  ects the ﬁ  nal income achieved by a country, given its initial income and annual growth rates:
Th  e  ﬁ  nal income
T y is invariant to the sequence in which the growth rates t y  appear. Further, the 
average (geometric mean) growth rate over the period is invariant to the sequence. Countries can possess 
identical per capita income growth rates but very diﬀ  erent growth sequences. As discussed brieﬂ  y below (and 
also noted, for example, in Reddy and Minoiu (2005)), the resulting distinct growth sequences can have very 
diﬀ  erent welfare implications.
Our focus in this paper is however on the description and interpretation of a possible feature of 
a growth sequence. In particular, we examine the occurrence in countries of uninterrupted sequences of 
negligible or negative income growth years (i.e., stagnation spells) as distinguished from patterns of negative 
income growth years alternating in some way with positive income growth years.
3  We use the mean income over the last three years of the decade to represent the income at the end of the decade.Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  5
Distinguishing Stagnation from other Features of the Growth Sequence






















Inter-temporal economic patterns can be sought in relation to any one of these three series. For 
example, it may be of interest to examine the lowness or (highness) of incomes, of growth rates, or of rates 
of acceleration. Th   e concept of stagnation employed in this paper adopts a focus on uninterrupted sequences 
of low growth rates. In contrast, other recent contributions to the literature (e.g., Hausmann, Pritchett and 
Rodrik, 2005) (henceforth, ‘HPR’) adopt a “hybrid” concept, which simultaneously refers to more than one 
of these levels of analysis. An episode of growth acceleration is deﬁ  ned by HPR as fulﬁ  lling the following 
conditions: the average growth rate between the beginning of the acceleration episode and its end is at least 
3.5 per cent per annum; the diﬀ  erence between the mean growth rate during the acceleration episode and 
the period preceding it is at least 2 per cent per annum. Finally, the post-episode income level is higher than 
the pre-episode peak. It is evident that HPR’s approach mizes criteria involving income levels, rates of growth 
and rates of growth acceleration. From this standpoint, it is far from clear that it captures growth accelera-
tions as such. Th   e criteria used also appear to be somewhat ad hoc.
Growth Patterns and Welfare
It should be noted that neither the concept of real income stagnation, nor that of growth accelerations, can 
be used straightforwardly for purposes of welfare assessment. In this section, we shall use a few examples to 
illustrate the issues involved in making welfare comparisons of income streams characterized by stagnation 
experiences and associated steady-growth counterfactuals.
If two countries’ income streams begin and end at the same income levels over a single time period, 
then the countries will possess the same (geometric) average growth rates. However, they may possess very 
diﬀ  erent income paths over this period. Consider, for example, the income growth experience of Jordan and 
Morocco between 1975 and 1991 [depicted in Figure 2]. In this period, the two countries had an average 
growth rate of 1.025 per cent. Th   eir (Penn World Table Version 6.1) per capita income in 1975 was in both 
cases around $2,400 and that in 1991 was in both cases approximately $3,600. While Jordan experienced 
rapid early income growth followed by a stagnation spell between 1987 and 1992, Morocco’s income path 
was characterized by fairly steady growth throughout the period. Despite the stagnation experience, Jor-
dan experienced higher welfare throughout the period according to a simple criterion, that of ﬁ  rst-order 
dominance of its income stream over Morocco’s: Jordan’s income stream was at least as high in every year as 
Morocco’s. On average during the period, Jordanians were richer than Moroccans by $1,093 international 
(1996 PPP) dollars.
Consider also the hypothetical case of two countries that possess the same average growth rate over 
a given period of time, and experience similar stagnation spells, but do so at diﬀ  erent times, and as a re-
sult experience very diﬀ  erent levels of material well-being. It is important to draw a distinction between an 
experience of stagnation which arises early in the study period and is followed by recovery, and an experience 
of stagnation that arises towards the end of the study period and is preceded by prolonged growth. An early 
stagnation spell followed by recovery will cause a country to have lost income relative to the steady-growth 6  DESA Working Paper No. 28
path, whereas an experience of high growth rates early on followed by a downturn towards the end of the pe-
riod will lead a country to have gained wealth relative to the same steady-growth path. While both countries 
will be classiﬁ  ed as stagnators (and possess the same average growth rate), the timing of the stagnation spell 
is greatly relevant to assessing whether the country has experienced gains or losses in welfare relative to the 
steady-growth counterfactual. It is not the experience of stagnation alone, but the entirety of the growth path 
that is important in assessing welfare.
Average growth rates are a useful summary statistic for the income growth experience of a country, 
but can conceal the occurrence of large gains and losses in wealth or welfare. Since it is implausible to believe 
that the (net) wealth which accrues to a country over a period of time is inconsequential for investment, cap-
ital accumulation and human well-being, we may conclude that features of the entire growth path (including 
the occurrence and timing of stagnation experiences) will have welfare implications.
Stagnation Experience across Countries and over Time
In the next section we rely primarily on a data set that we have constructed by expanding that used to 
analyze the determinants of growth by Levine and Renelt (1992). Our data set contains 119 countries for 
which constant LCU GDP per capita data are available over the period 1960-2001, thereby permitting the 
identiﬁ  cation of stagnation spells. Deﬁ  nitions and sources of all of the variables contained in the dataset are 
provided in Appendix 1. We treat the cases of small-island countries and transition countries (only some of 
which are included in the Levine and Renelt data set), separately.
Frequency and Features of Stagnation by Country Type
Countries in the Main Data Set
Table 1 reports the frequency with which stagnators appear among the countries that belong to the main 
data set. Of the 119 countries in the dataset, a remarkable 72 (or 60.5 per cent) are stagnators. Some striking 
Figure 2:
















































































Jordan (high income path) is 
a stagnator, while Morocco 
(low income path) is not. Both 
countries have the same average 
(geometric mean) growth rate 
over the period 1975-1991.Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  7
facts are immediately apparent. For example, only 4 of the 24 rich countries belonging to the OECD were 
stagnators in this period (16.7 per cent).4 In contrast 91.67 per cent (or 22 of 24) countries in Latin Ameri-
can and 82.5 per cent (or 33 of 40) countries in sub-Saharan Africa were stagnators.
It is also interesting to note that stagnators are heavily represented among countries dependent 
on primary commodities. Among countries belonging to OPEC, 8 of 10 were stagnators. We also check 
how prevalent stagnators are among primary commodity export dependent countries, by constructing two 
alternative measures of such dependence. Countries are classiﬁ  ed as primary commodity exporters according 
to criterion I if the share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 was above the mean level for 
the sample. Countries are classiﬁ  ed as primary commodity exporters according to criterion II if the share of 
exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 was one standard deviation above the mean level for the 
sample. It is interesting to note that a very large proportion of primary commodity exporting countries are 
stagnators; the proportion of stagnators is roughly the same regardless of which criterion is used to identify 
primary commodity exporting countries (87.5 per cent when criterion I is used, and 83.3 per cent when 
criterion II is used). A majority of landlocked countries (65.2 per cent) are also stagnators.
Table 2 reports in greater detail the stagnation experiences of the countries belonging to these diﬀ  er-
ent categories. It may be observed that the average depth of stagnation among stagnators varies considerably 
across geographical categories, from 0.24 in the case of Latin America to 0.44 in the case of sub-Saharan Af-
rica, whereas the average length of stagnation varies between 10 years (for Latin American countries) and 16 
years (in the case of sub-Saharan African countries). Th   us, sub-Saharan African countries tend to have both 
longer and deeper stagnation experiences than Latin American countries. Th   e former also tend to have more 
stagnation spells per country than the latter (1.5 spells per country compared to 1.3 spells per country).
Remarkably, oil-exporting (OPEC) countries have both the highest average depth of stagnation 
among all categories of countries (0.97), as well as the highest number of stagnation spells (1.8 spells per 
country). Intensive (criterion II) primary commodity exporters have an average length of stagnation of 18 
years (almost half the study period). Furthermore, the depth and length of stagnation increases with the 
intensity of primary commodity exports in GNP.
Appendix II identiﬁ  es the stagnation spells experienced by each of the countries in the sample as 
well as their traits. Th   e longest spell of stagnation was experienced by Zambia (33 years, from 1968 to 2000) 
and the deepest was experienced by Iraq (2.89).
Transition Countries
Transition countries are not included in the main dataset, as for many countries the data with which to un-
dertake the analysis do not exist for the period 1960 to 1990. Table 6 describes the frequency and features of 
stagnation among the transition countries, for which we have data during the period 1990-20015. Of the 26 
countries for which stagnation analysis was possible, 20 (or 77 per cent) were stagnators in this study period. 
Moreover, the average depth of stagnation was a striking 0.69 (more than two-thirds of the end of study 
period income) and the average length of stagnation was 6.6 (almost two-thirds of the study period). Th  e 
country with the maximum depth of stagnation (2.37) was Tajikistan, whereas the country with the maxi-
mum length of stagnation (11 years) was Moldova.
4 Th   e OECD stagnators are: Greece, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland. 
5  For several countries, there is data going back to as early as 1960 (Hungary and China) and 1965 (Georgia, Latvia and 
Russian Federation). We do not employ this data here. 8  DESA Working Paper No. 28
Small Island Developing States
Many small island developing states are also not included in the main dataset, due to gaps in the data avail-
able for many of them. Table 7 describes the frequency and features of stagnation among small island devel-
oping states (as identiﬁ  ed by the United Nations) for the period 1960 to 2001. Of 34 countries for which 
stagnation analysis was possible, 17 were stagnators. Th   e average depth of stagnation was 0.31 and the aver-
age length of stagnation was 11.5 years. Roughly half the island stagnators had a single spell of stagnation, 
and roughly half had two spells of stagnation. Th   e maximum depth of stagnation (1.82) was experienced by 
Kiribati, while the maximum length of stagnation (26 years) was experienced by Haiti.
Th   e World as a Whole
Th  e  uniﬁ  ed sample (including together the countries in the main dataset, transition countries and small 
island developing states) contains 178 countries. Of the 168 countries for which stagnation analysis was pos-
sible, 103 (61 per cent, i.e., more than half) were stagnators.
Experience Across the Decades (the World)
Th   e stagnation experience of countries across the decades is described in Table 3 (for countries in the main 
data set). It can be seen that the number of decadal stagnators increased sharply and steadily between the 
1960s (when there were 12, amounting to 12 per cent of the countries for which data was available) and the 
1980s (when there were 58, amounting to 50 per cent of the countries for which data was available), and 
diminished somewhat in the 1990s (to 36, amounting to 32 per cent of the countries for which data was 
available).
From a worldwide perspective, the 1980s seem to have been the worst decade. Th   e average length of 
stagnation peaked in the 1980s at almost 7 years, as did the average depth of stagnation at 0.20. Th  e  average 
depth of stagnation increased monotonically from the 1960s to the 1980s before diminishing in the 1990s. 
Th   e average length of stagnation varied between 5.5 and 6.8 years/country across the four decades, again 
peaking in the 1980s.
Experience Across the Decades (Regions)
Th   e proportion of countries that are stagnators (among the countries for which the analysis is possible) is 
higher in every decade in sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin America, with the exception of the 1980s (Tables 
5A and 5B). For the whole study period however, the proportion of Latin American stagnators exceeds that 
of sub-Saharan African stagnators. In both continents, the proportion of stagnators among countries increas-
es steadily through the decades, peaking in the 1980s (when it reached a maximum of 69 per cent in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, and 79 per cent in Latin America) and diminishing somewhat in the 1990s.
As shown in Table 4, in all four decades the countries that spent the longest number of years in stag-
nation were most likely to be in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in Table 5A, the average depth of stagnation 
was higher in Latin America than it was in Africa in all decades other than the 1990s. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
the average length of stagnation was highest in the 1980s and 1990s whereas in Latin America it was high-
est in the 1960s and 1980s. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average depth of stagnation was highest in the 1990s 
whereas in Latin America it was highest in the 1960s. Th   is suggests that the 1990s have not been a period of 
recovery in sub-Saharan Africa.Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  9
It is also interesting to examine the correlation between the length and depth of stagnation by region 
and decade (see Table 5B). It appears that in the 1990s, stagnation experiences in Latin America were likely 
to be long and deep. Th   is is also true, but to a lesser degree, in sub-Saharan Africa. It is notable that the cor-
relation between depth and length of stagnation seems to have been increasing monotonically across decades 
for countries in both continents. Over time, it has become more likely that stagnation spells will be both 
relatively deep and relatively long.
Factors Associated with Stagnation
In order to identify the factors associated with stagnation, we undertook a probit analysis of the factors that 
appear to aﬀ  ect the probability of being a stagnator. We treat whether a country is a stagnator as a binary 
dependent variable. Th   e probabilities of occurrence of stagnation are assumed to be inﬂ  uenced by the inde-
pendent variables and to be distributed normally.
In Table 9, we report the summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent regressions. 
Tables 10-11 outline the regression results for three versions of probit models with STAGNATOR (a variable 
which takes on a value of one when a country is a stagnator and a value of zero when it is not) as the depen-
dent variable.
Appendix 1 lists the variables used in the analysis. Summary statistics concerning the variables used 
in all the probit regressions discussed in this section of the paper are shown in Table 9. We have tried to in-
clude in the regressions undertaken (from which those reported are drawn) variables that are standard in the 
literature on the determinants of growth.
Th   e models have relatively good ‘ﬁ  t’, with pseudo-R2 ranging between 0.36 and 0.69. In addition, 
they show that certain factors are signiﬁ  cantly and often robustly associated with stagnation. Th  ese  include 
the growth rate of domestic credit, negatively associated with being a stagnator; the diﬀ  erence between the 
growth rate of the economically active population - between ages 15 and 65 - and the growth rate of the 
population total (‘GEAPOPP’), negatively associated with being a stagnator; a dummy variable taking the 
value one for primary commodity exporters (according to criterion I) and zero otherwise, positively associ-
ated with being a stagnator; the number of revolutions and coups per year, positively associated with being a 
stagnator; an index of civil liberties taking the value of 1 at the highest and 7 at the lowest, positively associ-
ated with being a stagnator (implying an association between weaker civil liberties and stagnation); a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for Latin American countries and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 for sub-Saharan African countries and zero otherwise, both positively associated with being a 
stagnator.
Th   e signs of these relationships are as one might predict, as is discussed below. Th   e magnitude of 
these relationships is also often very substantial, as shown in Table 12A (columns 1-3). For example, the 
probability that a country is a stagnator when GEAPOPP (the rate at which the growth of economically ac-
tive population outstrips the rate of growth of the entire population) is one-half a standard deviation above 
the mean for all countries is estimated (depending on the model speciﬁ  cation) to be between 41 and 46 per 
cent less than when it is one half a standard deviation below the mean.6 Th   e probability that a country is 
a stagnator when the number of revolutions and coups per year is one-half a standard deviation above the 
mean for all countries is estimated (depending on the model speciﬁ  cation) to be 20 per cent more than when 
6  We report here and in the remainder of this paragraph only on instances in which the variable in question is signiﬁ  cant.10  DESA Working Paper No. 28
it is one-half a standard deviation below the mean. Similarly, the probability that the country is a stagnator 
when the index of civil liberties is one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all countries is estimated 
to be 35 per cent more than when it is one-half a standard deviation below the mean. It is also found that 
primary commodity exporters according to criterion I have a probability of being a stagnator around 33 per 
cent above other countries.
As a check on the possibility that some of the factors considered above arise endogenously as a result 
of countries becoming stagnators, we repeated the analysis by using as the dependent variable STAGNA-
TOR90, a dummy variable taking on a value of one if a country was a stagnator in the 1990s, and zero 
otherwise. We used data for the independent variables from the earlier period 1960 to 1989, so as to capture 
possible lagged relationships running from these independent variables to STAGNATOR90.7 It is impor-
tant to be cautious in interpreting the results found here as revealing any causal information, however, since 
stagnation from decade to decade is highly correlated, as discussed further below. We ﬁ  nd the relationships 
to be somewhat weaker, but still to be present. As reported in Table 11, the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the 
Latin America Dummy, GEAPOPP, and the number of revolutions and coups per year are signiﬁ  cant. In 
contrast, the primary commodity exporter dummy I, the index of civil liberties, and the growth rate of do-
mestic credit are no longer signiﬁ  cant. Th   is is not wholly surprising, as the Sub Saharan Africa Dummy, the 
Latin America Dummy, and GEAPOPP (directly or indirectly) capture “structural” features of the economy 
that may have a long-term impact, whereas the index of civil liberties, and the growth rate of domestic credit 
represent phenomena (such as ambient political circumstances and the conduct of monetary policy) that 
may arguably have only a more transitory impact on economic performance.
It is also not surprising that measures of primary commodity export dependence are signiﬁ  cant 
determinants of stagnation, in light of the recent literature on the “natural resource curse”, which emphasizes 
that for a range of political and economic (e.g. “Dutch disease”) reasons, countries wealthy in natural re-
sources may be poor economic performers (see, for instance, Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Sachs and Warner 
(1999), Tornell and Lane (1999)). However, the lack of signiﬁ  cance of the primary commodity exporter 
dummy I in regressions of STAGNATOR90 raises a question mark about the robustness of this relationship. 
Th   is may be because a great deal of the eﬀ  ect of being a primary commodity exporter is captures by whether 
a country belongs in speciﬁ  c groupings (in particular Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa). Th   e number of 
stagnating countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the ﬁ  rst of our criteria but neither 
in Latin America nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only seven (Algeria, Fiji, Iceland, Iraq, Kuwait, New Zealand, 
Saudi Arabia). Th   e number of stagnating countries which are primary commodity exporters according to the 
second of our criteria, but are neither in Latin-American nor in sub-Saharan Africa is only four (Fiji, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). In the overall sample of 119 countries (of which 32 are primary commodity exporters 
according to the ﬁ  rst criterion and 12 according to the second), the resulting independent variation may be 
insuﬃ   cient to separately identify the eﬀ  ect of being a primary-commodity exporter on stagnation.
Th   e fact that GEAPOPP is signiﬁ  cant underlines that a rapid rate of population increase (or rapid 
aging) that creates an increased rate of dependency of the young and the elderly upon the productive workers 
in the middle age brackets, may be an important factor creating vulnerability to per capita income stagna-
tion. However, the relationship may be purely endogenous. It may simply be that stagnation causes a reduc-
tion in the economically active population and therefore a reduction in GEAPOPP. Th   is latter theory is a 
possible explanation of the results found in the regressions involving STAGNATOR but not of those involv-
ing STAGNATOR90, as the latter seeks to identify the factors associated with subsequent stagnation. Both 
7  Regression results using data from the earlier period 1974-1989 are similar to the ones we report here. Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  1 1
mechanisms may in fact be present. Th   is is suggested by the fact that the magnitude of the eﬀ  ect associated 
with GEAPOPP is substantially smaller in relation to STAGNATOR90 than in relation to STAGNATOR 
[See Table 12A].
It is interesting to note that the investment share of GDP is also occasionally signiﬁ  cant. Th  e  sign 
of the relationship suggests that higher investment is associated with a higher probability of stagnation. 
Th   is seems at ﬁ  rst implausible, but may be understood in light of the possibility that investment (especially 
planned public investment) is not always as downwardly ﬂ  exible as is real income. In this light, the identiﬁ  ed 
relationship may be more of an accounting curiosity than it is causally important.
In both sets of regressions, the Latin America dummy variable is consistently highly signiﬁ  cant, 
whereas the African dummy variable is moderately signiﬁ  cant only in the STAGNATOR90 regressions. One 
reason that this might be true is that the African dummy variable is highly correlated with other variables 
that are signiﬁ  cantly associated with being a stagnator (especially GEAPOPP, the primary commodity 
exporter dummy I, the number of revolutions and coups, and the index of civil liberties), whereas the Latin 
America dummy is not to the same extent. Th   is may be seen in Table 12B, which reports pair-wise correla-
tion coeﬃ   cients among the variables used in both sets of regressions. Although stagnators are more likely to 
be present in both Africa and Latin America, the factors underlying stagnation in Africa appear to be cap-
tured better by those included in the regression analysis than are the factors that underlie stagnation in Latin 
America. Th   e fact that the Latin America dummy variable is consistently signiﬁ  cant suggests that there are 
variables omitted from the analysis that are important causes of stagnation in Latin America.
The Tendency for Stagnation to Persist
It is possible to undertake an analysis of the tendency of countries to shift between non-stagnator and stag-
nator status.8 Below, we explore whether countries that have a speciﬁ  c status (as stagnators or non-stagna-
tors) in a particular decade are likely to maintain that status or change status in the subsequent decade. Th  is 
analysis is undertaken in Table 13A in terms of the raw number of countries that ‘stay or switch’ and in Table 
13B in terms of the proportion of countries that ‘stay or switch’ between stagnator and non-stagnator status 
in successive decades. Th   e analysis leads to some striking conclusions.
First, if a country is a decadal stagnator in the 60s, it has a relatively small chance of not being 
a decadal stagnator in the 1990s (8.3 per cent). In contrast, countries that are stagnators in the 1970s or 
1980s, have a higher chance of escaping stagnation by the end of the sample period (31.8 per cent and 37.9 
per cent, respectively). However, the probability of being a stagnator in the 1990s if a country was a stagna-
tor in previous decades is quite high: 75 per cent for stagnators from the 1960s, 54.5 per cent for stagnators 
from the 1970s, and 56.9 per cent for stagnators from the 1980s. Finally, the probability that a non-stag-
nator in the 1960s is a stagnator in the 1990s is relatively high (56.9 per cent). Th   e probability of being a 
stagnator in the 1990s is therefore raised by about 20 per cent by having been a stagnator (as opposed to a 
non-stagnator) in the 1960s.
8  Some caution is required in interpreting these results since the “transition” probabilities could be indicative 
of either transitory or systematic features of the causal process giving rise to stagnation. Furthermore, the 
estimates of the probabilities rely on one observation in the time series used to construct the stagnator 
dummy (i.e., on a single realization of the stochastic process that may be present in the world). Th  erefore, 
one cannot make a strong case based on these ﬁ  ndings unless further assumptions are made concerning the 
underlying process.12  DESA Working Paper No. 28
Th   e highest probability (37.9 per cent) of a stagnator becoming a non-stagnator in a subsequent de-
cade is experienced between the 1980s and the 1990s. Th   e highest probability of a non-stagnator remaining a 
non-stagnator (74.5 per cent) is experienced between the 1960s and the 1970s. It is notable that the probabil-
ity of switching out of stagnation has slightly increased over the decades. However, the probability of staying 
out of stagnation has not increased over the decades for the entire sample of countries. In fact, non-stagnators 
have had chances often signiﬁ  cantly higher than 50 of experiencing stagnation in subsequent decades.
It is most striking that the countries most likely to have been stagnators in the 1960s have a 75 per 
cent probability of being so in the 1990s. Th   is suggests that underlying and diﬃ   cult to change structural 
features of countries make them vulnerable to stagnation, or that stagnation episodes have long-lasting and 
detrimental eﬀ  ects that generate future vulnerability to stagnation.
It is also important to note that collapses do not occur randomly. Th   ere appear to be trigger eﬀ  ects 
that are concentrated geographically (sub Saharan Africa, Latin America). In sub-Saharan Africa (Tables 14A 
and 14B), once a stagnator, the probability of remaining a stagnator in a subsequent decade ranges between 
53.8 per cent and 77.8 per cent. Even worse, in the 1970s African non-stagnators were faced with a prob-
ability of 93.8 per cent of falling in stagnation during the 1980s. A similar pattern is observed for Latin 
American non-stagnators (Tables 15A and 15B), which had a probability of 88.9 per cent of stagnating in 
the 1980s, if they had not stagnated in the 1970s. Th   e data are suggestive of the fact that structural features 
of the economy may play an important role: if they have stagnated in the 1960s, African countries are 77.8 
per cent likely to have stagnated in the 1990s, while if they have stagnated in the 1960s Latin American 
stagnators are 100 per cent likely to have stagnated in the 1990s.
Conclusions
We have examined the patterns and causes of real income stagnation (in which real-income growth was neg-
ligible or negative for a sizable uninterrupted sequence of years) during the last four decades in a large cross 
section of countries. Real income stagnation is a concept concerning the pattern of economic growth, and is 
distinct from that of low average growth as such. We have argued that real income stagnation is also con-
ceptually diﬀ  erent from other growth patterns studied in the literature (e.g., those proposed by Hausmann, 
Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005). However, all such concepts must be used with care when undertaking welfare 
assessment.
We have found evidence to suggest that a large number of poor countries in the world have suﬀ  ered 
deep and lengthy spells of stagnation in the last four decades. Th   ese spells of stagnation have caused many 
of these countries to have lower incomes today than they had at some point in the past. All countries which 
have experienced stagnation spells have lost ‘potential’ income. Countries that suﬀ  ered stagnation are more 
likely to have been poor, to have been located in certain regions of the world (in particular Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa), to have been conﬂ  ict-ridden and dependent on primary commodity exports.
Countries that suﬀ  ered from stagnation in the distant past are also much more likely to have suf-
fered from stagnation in the recent past. Th   ese results suggest either that stagnation spells have long-lasting 
eﬀ  ects that make the reoccurrence of stagnation likely or that there are enduring ‘structural’ features (within 
countries or in the global economy) that predispose speciﬁ  c countries to suﬀ  er repeatedly from stagnation 
episodes. Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  1 3
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Tables and Charts 
 
 
Table 1. Prevalence of Stagnation by Country Type (Main Data Set) 
 
Sample description:  
Total number of countries in the Levine-
Renelt data set (1992)  
119 
Total number of countries for which 
stagnation analysis was possible based on 
GDP per capita in LCUs  
119
a 
Total number of stagnators (1960-2001)  72 
 
 
Country Type  Number of 
countries 






countries in total  
Sub-Saharan Africa  40  33  82.50 
Latin America  24  22  91.67 
OECD 24  4  16.67 








12 10  83.33 
Landlocked countries
d 23  15  65.21 
 
a The only country for which GDP per capita in constant LCU is not available is Taiwan. We have used real GDP 
adjusted for PPP in US$ from the Economist Intelligence Unit country data online instead.  
b Based on the first measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 above the 
mean are considered primary commodity exporters.  
c Based on the second measure: countries with share of exports of primary commodities in GNP in 1970 above 
one standard deviation from the mean are considered primary commodity exporters.  
d This is the variables ACCESS from the Sachs and Warner dataset. Physical access to international waters is 
measured by our land-lockedness variable. A country that borders the ocean (a "coastal economy") and that has a 
container port is given a value of 0, reflecting complete access to international shipping. A landlocked country 
without navigable access to the sea via rivers is given a value of 1.  
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Table 2. Characteristics of Stagnation Spells by Country Type (Main Data Set) 















33 0.44  16  1.5  33 years: 
Zambia 
Latin America  22  0.24  10  1.3  26 years:  
Haiti 
OECD countries  4  0.03  7  1.3  7 years:  
Greece 




Exporters I  




Exporters II  




15 0.54  16  1.7  33  years: 
Zambia 
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Table 3. Frequency and features of Stagnation by Decade (Main Data Set) 























Number of stagnators in the overall study 
period for which data are available in the 
decade
a 
63 68 70 68 
Percentage of stagnators in the overall study 
period for which data are available in the 
decade  
88% 94% 97% 94% 
Number of countries for which data are 
available
b 
103 112 116 114 
Percentage of decadal stagnators among all 

















Average depth of stagnation  0.14  0.15  0.20  0.15 
Total number of spells
c    12 23 58 43 
Average number of spells per country in the 
decade 
1 1.13  1.1  1 
 
a No data in the 1960s for the following stagnators: Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Jordan, Mali, 
Mozambique, Surinam and Tanzania. No data in the 1970s for Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania; No 
data in the1980s for stagnators Afghanistan and Tanzania. No data in the 1990s for Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and 
Somalia.  
b No data in the 1960s for non-stagnators Cyprus, West Germany, Mauritius, Swaziland, Turkey, Uganda and 
Yemen. No data in the 1970s for non-stagnators Mauritius, Uganda and Yemen. No data in the 1980s for non-
stagnator Yemen. No data in the 1990s for non-stagnator Oman.  
c The total no. of spells is almost the same as the total no. of countries, with the exception of the 1970s, when 
Chad experienced two stagnation spells. Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  1 7
 
Table 4. Longest and Deepest Stagnation by Decade (Main Data Set) 
Decade  Longest stagnation  Length of Stagnation 
1960s  Afghanistan, Chad, Haiti, Kuwait, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan  
7 years 
1970s  Kuwait, Zambia  10 years 
1980s  Central African Republic, Dem. Republic of 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Zambia  
10 years 
1990s  Central African Republic, Dem. Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kenya, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Zambia  
10 years 
 
Decade  Deepest Stagnator  Depth of Stagnation 
60s Haiti  0.76 
70s Kuwait  0.67 
80s Iraq  1.95 
90s  Democratic Republic of Congo  1.23 
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Tables 5A&B. Frequency and Features of Stagnation Spells by Decade and Continent (Sub-










33 9  13  27  25 
Total number of 
countries for which 












stagnators among the 
countries for which 











Average depth  0.44  0.08  0.15  0.15  0.21 






22 1  4  19  10 
Total number of 
countries for which 












stagnators among the 
countries for which 












Average depth  0.24  0.41  0.15  0.17  0.07 
Average length  10  7  4  7  5 
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5B: Correlations Between Length and Depth of Stagnation by Region and Decade 
 1960-
2000 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Entire sample  0.55  0.28  0.50  0.33  0.54 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
0.56 0.12  0.26  0.39  0.47 
Latin America   0.69  N/A
a 0.12 0.48 0.78 
 
a The only Latin American country stagnating in the 1960s is Haiti.  
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Table 6. Frequency and Features of Stagnation among Transition Countries 
 
Sample Description  
Total number of countries in the sample   29 
Total number of countries for which stagnation analysis was 
possible based on GDP per capita in constant LCU
a 
26 
Total number of stagnators (1990-2001)  20 
 
Frequency and Features of Stagnation 
 Number  of 
stagnators 
(1990-2001) 





















a The three transition countries for which spell analysis is not possible are Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  


































1985 1990 1995 2000
year
maximum depth among transition countries (2.37)
Tajikistan:
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Table 7. Frequency and Features of Stagnation among Small Island Developing States 
 
Sample description  
Total number of countries in the sample   41
a 
Total number of countries for which 
stagnation analysis was possible based on 
GDP per capita in constant LCUs 
34
b 
Total number of stagnators (1960-2001)  17 
 
  Number of 
stagnators 
(1960-2001) 
Average depth  Average length 
(in years) 
Average number 
















 Maximum   
depth: 1.82  
Kiribati 
Maximum 
length: 26 years 
Haiti 
Maximum #  




a The list of small island developing states is available at: http://www.sidsnet.org/sids_list.html (accessed: March 
25, 2005)  
b The 7 small island developing states for which spells analysis was not impossible due to few data points or 
inexistent data are: Cook Islands, Cuba, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tokelau and Tuvalu.  
c 50 per cent of small island developing states for which data are available, qualify as stagnators. 
d The 7 small island developing states that have experienced 2 spells of stagnation during the sample period are: 









































1970 1980 1990 2000
year
maximum depth among small island developing states (1.82)
Kiribati:
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Table 8. Frequency and Features of Stagnation throughout the World 
 
Summary statistics for the unified sample
a 
Total number of countries in the sample   178 
Total number of countries for which stagnation analysis was possible based 
on GDP per capita in constant LCUs 
168 
Total number of stagnators   103 
Percentage of stagnators (in the total number of countries for which data 
are available)  
61% 
 
Decadal summary statistics for the unified sample 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Total number of stagnators  12  26  67  71 
Total number of countries for which data are 
available 
69 78 94  102 
% of stagnators (in the total number of 










a Note: the unified sample is made up of the main data set (which already contains 11 small island developing 
states), the list of transition countries and that of small island developing states. Of these, six are stagnators (and 
are only counted once in Table 8): Barbados, Fiji, Haiti, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea and Trinidad & Tobago. 
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STAGNATOR       0.000  1.000 
STAGNATOR90       0.000  1.000 
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log)   0.142  0.934  -1.570  1.999 
Literacy rate (1960) (log)   -1.116  1.112  -4.605  0.000 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989)  23.525  20.449  -15.424  134.730 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989)  0.208  0.058  0.092  0.402 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989)  6.783  4.824  -0.938  37.454 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy      0.000  1.000 
Latin America Dummy      0.000  1.000 
GEAPOPP 0.210  0.343  -0.341  1.117 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I      0.000  1.000 
Revolutions and Coups per year (1960-1984)  0.217  0.253  0.000  1.150 
Index of Civil Liberties (1972-1985)   3.992  1.853  1.000  6.900 
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Table 10. Factors Associated with Stagnation.  
 








      
      
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log)  0.4633  0.9380*  1.3593** 
 [0.5598]  [0.5286]  [0.6758] 
Literacy (1960) (log)   -1.0464  -0.8698  -0.4891 
 [0.6591]  [0.5837]  [0.6352] 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989) -0.0170*  -0.0227  -0.0363** 
 [0.0096]  [0.0146]  [0.0146] 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989)  6.9502  10.5224**  11.3272** 
 [4.2539]  [4.7323]  [5.1783] 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989)  0.1062  0.1724*  0.1912** 
 [0.0809]  [0.0961]  [0.0873] 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy  0.7174  1.8417**  0.9905 
 [0.7530]  [0.8580]  [0.9295] 
Latin America Dummy  4.1204***  4.7922***  5.3650*** 
 [0.9604]  [1.0573]  [1.1102] 
GEAPOPP -4.3521***  -4.7758***  -6.0371*** 
 [1.3672]  [1.4132]  [1.8060] 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I  1.6163**  1.6821**  2.1314*** 
 [0.7616]  [0.7835]  [0.7536] 
Revolutions and coups per year (1960-1984)    3.2567**   
   [1.4914]   
Index of civil liberties 1972-1985 (1: most freedom)      0.7853*** 
     [0.2358] 
Constant -2.8607**  -4.7907***  -6.3294*** 
 [1.3520]  [1.3859]  [1.8285] 
      
      
      
Observations 83  83  83 
Log-likelihood -21.02  -18.77  -17.85 
Pseudo R-squared  0.63  0.67  0.69 
% correctly predicted  87.95%  91.57%  91.57% 
      
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  2 5
 
Table 11. Factors Associated with Stagnation: 
 








     
Real GDP per capita (1960) (log)  0.2028  0.0028  0.2453 
  [0.2937] [0.3314] [0.3105] 
Literacy (1960) (log)  -0.3219  -0.3424  -0.3020 
  [0.3034] [0.3371] [0.3097] 
Growth Rate of Domestic Credit (1960-1989)  -0.0105 -0.0092 -0.0107 
  [0.0087] [0.0083] [0.0088] 
Investment Share of GDP (1960-1989)  2.5637  0.7630  2.3693 
  [4.8833] [4.9879] [4.9369] 
Growth of Exports (1960-1989)  0.0187  0.0337  0.0187 
  [0.0615] [0.0649] [0.0607] 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy  1.5215**  1.2064**  1.5137** 
  [0.6113] [0.6109] [0.6089] 
Latin American Dummy  1.7386***  2.0243***  1.7246*** 
  [0.5038] [0.5559] [0.5037] 
GEAPOPP -0.9701  -1.5778*  -0.9284 
  [0.8074] [0.9074] [0.7978] 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I  0.5072  0.6422  0.5234 
  [0.4287] [0.4545] [0.4278] 
Revolutions and coups per year (1960-1984)    -2.5569***   
   [0.9135]   
Index of civil liberties 1972-1985 (1: most freedom)      0.0404 
    [0.1209] 
Constant -1.9792*  -1.1471  -2.0818* 
  [1.0223] [0.9913] [1.0638] 
     
     
     
Observations  83 83 83 
Log-likelihood    -35.93 -32.67 -35.91 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.36 0.42 0.36 
% correctly predicted  79.52%  81.93%  79.52% 
     
 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  26  DESA Working Paper No. 28
 
Table 12A. Effects on the dependent variable for Probit models  
(dependent variable STAGNATOR in (1)-(3) and STAGNATOR90 in (4)-(6)) 
 
Effects for the continuous regressors are shown for changes from their sample mean minus ½ 
standard deviation to their sample means plus ½ standard deviation. For discrete regressors, the 
effect of a change from 0 to 1 is shown.  













Real GDP per capita (1960) (log)  0.131 
 
0.250 0.302 0.072 0.001 0.086 
Literacy (1960) (log)  -0.325 
 
-0.260 -0.122 -0.127 -0.134 -0.119 




-0.136 -0.180 -0.082 -0.071 -0.084 




0.173 0.154 0.055 0.016 0.188 




0.178    0.163 0.025 0.045 0.051 
Sub Saharan Africa Dummy  0.190 
 
0.384    0.191 0.551 0.447 0.548 
Latin America Dummy  0.570 
 
0.607 0.576 0.613 0.684 0.610 
GEAPOPP  -0.412 
 
-0.432 -0.463 -0.118 -0.189 -0.113 
Primary Commodity Exporter Dummy I  0.349 
 
0.339 0.323 0.193 0.244 0.199 




   -0.206   
Index of civil liberties (1972-1985)  
(1: most freedom) 
   0.347 
 
   0.028 
 
Note: no standard errors are reported for the point estimates.  Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  2 7
 
Table 12B. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 











and coups per 
year 
Index of civil 
liberties 
Sub Saharan Africa 
Dummy 
1.000     
      
Demographic control 
(GEAPOPP) 
-0.544 1.000    
 (0.000)         
Primary Commodity 
Exporter Dummy I 
0.265 -0.101 1.000   
 (0.006)  (0.334)       
Revolutions and coups 
per year 
0.179 -0.252 -0.073 1.000   
  (0.052) (0.014) (0.463)     
Index of civil liberties  0.553 -0.356 0.173 0.476 1.000
(1: most freedom)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000)   
 
Note: p-values in parentheses. 
 










and coups per 
year 




1.000      
       
Demographic control 
(GEAPOPP) 
0.314 1.000    
 (0.002)         
Primary Commodity 
Exporter Dummy I 
-0.001 -0.101 1.000   
 (0.996)  (0.334)       
Revolutions and coups 
per year 
0.105 -0.252 -0.073 1.000   
  (0.257) (0.014) (0.463)     
Index of civil liberties  -0.135 -0.356 0.173 0.476 1.000
(1: most freedom)  (0.146) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000)   
 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  28  DESA Working Paper No. 28
 

















Stag60s           
Nonstag60s            
Stag70s 8  13         
Nonstag70s 4  38         
Stag80s   9  43  15  41     
Nonstag80s 2  8  6  5     
Stag90s 9  29  12  28  33  9 
Nonstag90s 1  20  7    17  22  3 
 
Note: A given cell (row, column) represents the number of countries in a given status during a decade (row) that 
had a specific status in a subsequent decade (column). For example, the number 9 in the first column of data 
should be interpreted as follows: 9 countries that were stagnators in the 1960s were also stagnators in the 1980s. 
The number 17 in the fourth column of data should be read as follows: 17 countries that were not stagnators in the 
1970s were not stagnators in the 1990s either.  
 













Stag60s         
Nonstag60s         
Stag70s  66.7%  25.5%      
Nonstag70s  33.3%  74.5%      
Stag80s 75.0%  84.3%  68.2%  89.1%     
Nonstag80s 16.7% 15.7%  27.3%  10.9%     
Stag90s  75.0%  56.9% 54.5% 60.9% 56.9% 75.0% 
Nonstag90s  8.3%  39.2% 31.8% 36.9% 37.9% 25.0% 
 
Note: A given cell (row, column) represents the proportion of countries in a given status during a decade (row) 
that had a specific status in a subsequent decade (column). For example, the number 75.0% in the first column of 
data should be interpreted as follows: 75.0 per cent of countries that were stagnators in the 1960s were also 
stagnators in the 1980s. The number 89.1% in the fourth column of data should be read as follows: 89.1 per cent 
of countries that were not stagnators in the 1970s were stagnators in the 1980s.  Real Income Stagnation of Countries, 1960-2001  2 9
 

















Stag60s         
Nonstag60s         
Stag70s 6 6     
Nonstag70s  3 12      
Stag80s 7 17  10  15    
Nonstag80s 2  1  3  1     
Stag90s  7  14 7 15  20 4 
Nonstag90s  1  3 4 1 5 1 
 













Stag60s         
Nonstag60s            
Stag70s 66.7%  33.3%        
Nonstag70s 33.3%  66.7%         
Stag80s 77.8%  94.4%  76.9%  93.8%    
Nonstag80s 22.2%  5.6%  23.1%  6.3%     
Stag90s 77.8%  77.8%  53.8%  93.8%  74.1%  80.0% 
Nonstag90s 11.1%  16.7%  30.8%  6.3%  18.5% 20.0% 
 30  DESA Working Paper No. 28
 

















Stag60s         
Nonstag60s         
Stag70s 0 4     
Nonstag70s  1 16      
Stag80s 1 17  3  16    
Nonstag80s 0  3  1  2     
Stag90s  1  9 2 8 8 2 
Nonstag90s  0  11 2 10  11 1 
 














Stag60s        
Nonstag60s            
Stag70s 0.0%  20.0%         
Nonstag70s 100.0%  80.0%         
Stag80s 100.0%  85.0%  75.0%  88.9%    
Nonstag80s 0.0%  15.0% 25.0% 11.1%     
Stag90s 100.0%  45.0%  50.0%  44.4%  42.1%  66.7% 
Nonstag90s 0.0%  55.0% 50.0% 55.6% 57.9% 33.3% 
 




VII. Appendix I. Variables: description and sources 
 
Variable description  Source 
Dummy for landlocked countries   Sachs and Warner data set
a  
 
GDP per capita in constant LCUs  World Development Indicators 2002  
 
Real GDP per capita (1960)  Levine and Renelt data set
b, originally from 
PWT 5.6 
Real GDP per capita (1970, 1980, 1990)   PWT 6.1 
Literacy rate (1960)   Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBSI  
Growth of real per capita GDP (chain) (averages 
over different time periods)  
Calculation by authors.  
PWT 6.1 
Growth rate of domestic credit (average: 1960-
1989)  
Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
IMFIFS 
Investment share of GDP (average: 1960-1989)  Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBNA 
Investment share of GDP (averages over different 
time periods) 
PWT 6.1  
Growth of exports (1960-1989)   Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
WBNA 
GEAPOPP: Difference between the growth rate of 
the economically active population (between ages 
15 and 65) and growth of total population.  
Sachs and Warner data set 
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 
1970 
Sachs and Warner data set 
Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters 
according to criterion I  
A country is classified as a primary 
commodity exporter if its share of exports 
of primary products in GNP in 1970 is 
greater than the mean of the 172 countries 
in the Sachs and Warner dataset. Primary 
commodity exporters defined as such are: 
Algeria, Barbados, Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Fiji, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, 
Iceland, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  
 32  DESA Working Paper No. 28
 
 
Dummy variable for primary commodity exporters 
according to criterion II  
A country is classified as a primary 
commodity exporter if its share of exports 
of primary products in GNP in 1970 is 
greater by more than one standard deviation 
above the mean for the 172 countries in the 
Sachs and Warner data set. Primary 
commodity exporters defined as such are: 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Zambia  
Number of revolutions and coups per year  
(1960-1984)  
Levine and Renelt data set, originally from 
Barro (1991)  




Dummies for countries that are classified as 
stagnators using GDP per capita in constant 
LCUs  
Depth of stagnation  Calculation by authors.  
 
Length of stagnation  Calculation by authors. 
 
Number of stagnation spells Calculation  by  authors. 
 
Small island developing states  UN classification
c 
 
Public expenditure on health as percentage of GDP 
(1990-2000) 
World Development Indicators 2003 
Life expectancy, under five mortality, and infant 
mortality 
World Development Indicators 2003  
 
Notes on abbreviations: 
IMFIFS  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics  
PWT 5.6  Penn World Table Version 5.6  
WBNA  World Bank National Accounts  
WBSI  World Bank Social Indicators  
PWT 6.1   Penn World Table Version 6.1  
 
a Available at: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/datasets/sachs/sachs.htm (accessed: March 25, 2005) 
b Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlevren.htm (accessed: March 25, 2005) 
c Available at: http://www.sidsnet.org/sids_list.html (accessed: March 25, 2005)  
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